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Abstract. Database management systems (DBMS), which are the ultimate layer 
in preventing malicious data access or corruption, implement several security 
mechanisms to protect data. However these mechanisms cannot always stop 
malicious users from accessing the data by exploiting system vulnerabilities. In 
fact, when a malicious user accesses the database there is no effective way to 
detect and stop the attack in due time. This practical experience report presents 
a tool that implements concurrent intrusion detection in DBMS. This tool 
analyses the transactions the users execute and compares them with the profile 
of the authorized transactions that were previously learned in order to detect 
potential deviations. The tool was evaluated using the transactions from a 
standard database benchmark (TPC-W) and a real database application. Results 
show that the proposed intrusion detection tool can effectively detect SQL-
based attacks with no false positives and no overhead to the server. 
Keywords: Databases, security, intrusion detection. 
1   Introduction 
Traditional database security mechanisms offer basic security features such as 
authentication, authorization, access control, data encryption, and auditing. However, 
these mechanisms do not assure protection against the exploitation of vulnerabilities 
in database management systems (DBMS) and are very limited in defending data 
attacks from the inside of the organization. In fact, as typical database security 
mechanisms are not primarily designed to detect intrusions (they are designed to 
avoid the intruder’s access to the data), there are many cases where the execution of 
malicious sequences of SQL1 commands (transactions) cannot be detected or avoided. 
The general lack of intrusion detection features in typical DBMS is an important 
limitation when it is necessary to assure a strong data security policy. In fact, 
intrusion detection in DBMS has not been studied much, in a clear contrast to what 
has happened in operating systems and networking fields, where many intrusion 
detection approaches have been proposed. However, malicious actions in a database 
application may not be seen as malicious by existing intrusion detection mechanisms 
at the network or the operating system levels. Furthermore, inside attacks are 
particularly difficult to detect and isolate, as the attacks are carried out by legitimate 
users that may have access rights to data and system resources. In addition, daily 
routine and long established habits tend to relax many security procedures. Even 
                                                 
1 SQL stands for Structured Query Language, the relational language used by relational DBMS 
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simple things such as choosing strong passwords and periodically purging unused 
database accounts are often neglected in many organizations [2]. This way, a practical 
tool for intrusion detection in DBMS that detects malicious behavior from 
applications and users will provide an extra layer of security that cannot be assured by 
classic security mechanisms. 
According to a FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey [3] in 2005, 
approximately 45% of the inquired entities had reported unauthorized access to 
information estimating a loss of $31.233.100 and a loss of $30.933.000 due to theft of 
proprietary information. Up to 56% reported unauthorized use of computer systems 
and 13% did not know if they had been attacked. Furthermore, 95% of the inquired 
entities reported more than 10 web site incidents. These figures show the relevance of 
an intrusion detection mechanism at DBMS level. 
Masquerade attacks where people hide their identity by impersonating other people 
on the computer are one of the most frequent forms of security attacks [4], including 
in the database domain. Another common database attack is SQL injection in web 
applications [5], where unchecked input is sent to a back-end database for execution. 
The attacker can perform this by simply changing the SQL query sent to the server, 
accessing sensitive data.  
The intrusion detection tool presented in this practical experience report adds 
concurrent intrusion detection to DBMS. This way, data security attacks can be 
detected and stopped immediately while the mechanism may call the attention of the 
database administrator (DBA) by sending an email or an SMS message). This tool, 
named IIDD - Integrated Intrusion Detection in Databases, works in two modes: 
transactions learning and intrusion detection. During transactions learning, the IIDD 
extracts the information it needs directly from the network packets sent from client 
applications to the database server using a network sniffer. The result is the directed 
graph representing the sequence of SQL commands that composes the authorized 
transactions. The learned graph is used later on by the concurrent intrusion detection 
engine. When an intrusion is detected an alarm is raised and, depending on the tool 
configuration, the database connection between the intruder and the server may be 
killed. In this case the connection is abruptly broken, and the database automatically 
performs a rollback of the malicious transaction. An important aspect is that this tool 
can be easily used in any commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) DBMS. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents our approach to 
intrusion detection in DBMS. Section 3 describes the proposed tool. Section 4 
presents two examples of utilization of the intrusion detection tool and Section 5 
concludes the paper. 
2   Intrusion detection approach 
The main goal of security in DBMS is to protect the system and the data from 
intrusion and unauthorized accesses, even when the potential intruder gets access to 
the machine where the DBMS is running. To protect the database from intrusion, the 
DBA must prevent and remove potential attacks and vulnerabilities. System 
vulnerabilities are an internal factor related to the set of security mechanisms 
available (or not available at all) in the system, the correct configuration of those 
mechanisms, which is a responsibility of the DBA, and the hidden flaws (bugs) in the 
system implementation. Vulnerability prevention consists of guarantying that the 
software used has the minimum vulnerabilities possible and this can be achieved by 
using adequate DBMS software. On the other hand, because the effectiveness of 
security mechanisms depends on their correct configuration and use, the DBA must 
correctly configure them by following administration best practices. Vulnerability 
removal consists in reducing the vulnerabilities found in the system. The DBA must 
pay attention to the new security patches released by software vendors and install 
those patches as soon as possible. Furthermore, any configuration problems detected 
in the security mechanisms must be immediately corrected. 
Security attacks are an external factor that mainly depends on the intentionality and 
capability of humans to maliciously break into the system taking advantage of 
potential vulnerabilities. The prevention against security attacks includes all the 
measures needed to minimize (or eliminate) the potential attacks against the system. 
On the other hand, attack removal is related to the adoption of measures to stop 
attacks that have occurred before. 
General methods for intrusion detection in computer systems are based either on 
pattern recognition or on anomaly detection. Pattern recognition is the search for 
known attack signatures in the commands executed. Anomaly detection is the search 
for deviations from an historical profile of good commands. 
Schonlau et al [4] evaluated several anomaly detection approaches and concluded 
that methods based on the idea that commands not previously seen in the training data 
may indicate an intrusion attempted, are among the most powerful approaches for 
intrusion detection. Our intrusion detection approach uses this idea, extending it to a 
set of SQL commands. However, unlike intrusion detection approaches used in 
distributed systems that usually rely on sets of predefined commands (normally a 
small number) or assume the commands are unrelated, in our approach, the SQL 
commands and their order in each database transaction are relevant. 
In spite of all the classical security mechanism developed in the database area, 
current DBMS are not well prepared for high-assurance privacy and confidentiality 
[6]. A very important component for the new generation of security aware DBMS is 
an intrusion detection mechanism [7]. Recent works have addressed concurrent 
intrusion detection (and attack isolation) in DBMS, and this issue is clearly getting 
more and more attention.  
DEMIDS [8] is a misuse detection system tailored to relational database systems. It 
uses audit logs to derive user profiles describing typical behavior of users in the 
DBMS. Chung introduces the notion of distance measure and frequent item sets to 
capture the working scopes of users using a data mining algorithm. In [9] a real-time 
intrusion detection mechanism based on the profile of user roles is proposed. An 
intrusion attack and isolation mechanism was proposed in [10]. This mechanism uses 
triggers and transaction profiles to keep track of the items read and written by 
transactions and isolates attacks by rewriting user SQL statements. The use of data 
dependency relationships and Petri-Nets to model normal data update patterns was 
proposed in [11] to detect malicious database transactions. DIDAFIT [12] works by 
matching SQL statements against a known set of valid transactions fingerprints. The 
algorithm consists in representing SQL as regular expressions using heuristics to 
assure a low level of false positives. Vieira and Madeira [13] focused on the detection 
of malicious DBMS transactions by using database audit logs to obtain the sequences 
of SQL commands executed by users, with the assumption that the transaction 
profiles was known in advance, and provided manually to the detection mechanism.  
 
Although intrusion detection has already been addressed in the works introduced 
above, intrusion detection at DBMS level continues to be an open issue. The purpose 
of the present work is to provide a generic tool that can be used in any database 
application. This way, the proposed intrusion detection tool is available at [14] for 
download and public utilization. 
2.1   Database transactions profiles 
In a typical database environment transactions are programmed in the client database 
applications, which means that the set of transactions remains stable, as long as the 
application is not changed. For example, in a banking database application users can 
only perform the operations available at the application interface (e.g., withdraw 
money, balance check account, etc). No other operation is available for the end-users 
(e.g., end-users cannot execute ad-hoc SQL commands). This way, it is possible to 
use transaction profiles for intrusion detection with a reduced risk of false alarms. 
Our intrusion detection tool uses the profile of the transactions implemented by the 
database applications (authorized transactions) to identify user attempts to execute 
unauthorized SQL commands. A database transaction is represented as a directed 
graph describing the different execution paths (sequences of selects, inserts, updates, 
deletes, and stored procedure invocations) from the beginning of the transaction to the 
commit or rollback commands. The nodes in the graph represent commands and the 
arcs represent the valid execution sequences. Depending on the data being processed 
several execution paths may exist for the same transaction and an execution path may 
include cycles representing the repetitive execution of sets of commands (a typical 
example of cycles in a transaction is the insertion of a variable number of lines in a 
customer’s order). The transaction ends with a commit or rollback command. The 
directed graph representing the profile of valid transactions is used to detect 
unauthorized transactions, which are seen as invalid sequences of SQL commands. 
This is done by concurrently analyzing the transactions the users execute and 
comparing them to the profile of the authorized transactions that were previously 
learned. To learn the profiles and to detect the malicious transactions the following 
information is required for each command executed: 
– User name: name of the user who executes the command; 
– Session ID: identification of the session established when the client application 
connects to the database server; 
– Action executed: text of the SQL command. This includes the identification of 
the end of the transaction (that is the start of a new transaction), which is forced by 
a commit or a rollback command; 
– Time stamp of the action: time stamp of the execution of the SQL command. 
 
An important aspect is that the nodes in the graph do not represent concrete 
commands since these may differ slightly in different executions. For example, 
consider the following SQL command to select the data from a given employee: 
“SELECT * from EMP where job like 'CLERK' and SAL >1000”. The job and the 
salary in the select criteria (job like ? and sal > ?) depend on the targeted data. This 
way, instead of considering concrete commands we have to represent those 
commands in a generic way. The approach consists of parsing the SQL commands 
and removing all the parts that are not generic (e.g., numbers and strings between 
quotes are removed). Also, the characters of the command are changed to lowercase. 
The proposed intrusion detection technique does not apply to applications that 
support the execution of ad-hoc queries, as in this case there are no predefined 
transactions. However, ad-hoc queries normally target decision support system and 
are not executed in typical database applications, because this type of queries would 
ruin the performance of the system. The decision support databases are known as data 
warehouses [15] and are physically separated from typical databases, because the type 
of queries executed and the data structures used to store data are completely different 
from typical databases. End-users that process ad-hoc queries represent a small group 
(managers and decision making personnel) that use a specific type of databases (data 
warehouses). Data warehouses are periodically loaded with new data that represents 
the activity of the business since the last load (normally the periodical loads are done 
on a daily basis). This is part of data warehouses life-cycle and follows a predefined 
set of rules that are implemented in the loading applications. Our intrusion detection 
technique is also applicable in this case because it provides the data warehouse server 
with the capability to detect malicious actions that try to modify the data.  
2.2   Learning the authorized profiles 
Transaction learning consists of identifying the authorized transactions and 
representing those transactions as a directed graph specifying the sequences of valid 
commands. The goal is to automatically learn the transaction profiles obtained 
through the reading of the network packets sent by the client applications to the 
database server and store them as a directed graph to be used in the detection phase. 
Obviously, the learning process must be executed in controlled conditions that should 
cover the different database application functionalities and, at the same time, must be 
free of intrusion attempts (which would potentially lead to the identification of 
malicious transactions as authorized ones). It is worth noting that all the database 
transactions must be executed during the learning phase, which should be achieved in 
a controlled environment virtually free of intrusion attempts (i.e., without the database 
fully open to all the users). There are three ways to obtain the transactions profiles: 
– Manual profiling can be easily performed when the DBA knows the execution 
profile of the client application and the number and size of the transactions is not 
too high. The DBA can create manually the graphs describing the authorized 
transactions. 
– Concurrently during the normal utilization of the application. In this case special 
attention must be taken in order to guarantee that the application is free of attacks 
during the learning period. This procedure can be shortened by manually 
executing some of the functions of the application. 
– Running application tests. Database applications are often tested using interface 
testing tools that generate exhaustive tests that exercise all the application 
functionalities. In most cases these tests are specified by highly-trained testers, but 
can also be generated automatically [16, 17].  
 
When an end-user (client) connects to the database a session is established. The 
session information travels across the network and the relevant information can be 
captured by a well positioned sniffer application. After establishing the session the 
 
user can start executing the client application operations. During execution the 
application accesses the database through the network sending SQL commands and 
receiving results. The sniffer reads all that flux of information and retains just what it 
needs. The capture of information will last until the DBA is confident that all the 
transactions implemented by the application have been executed at least one time. The 
sniffer can read the network information that is both encrypted or in clear text. To be 
able to parse encrypted information, the intrusion detection tool must have access to 
the decryption function and key. An alternative is to place the intrusion detection tool 
as a proxy, able to perform secure communication with the database client 
applications. 
One of the key points in the learning phase, and in the detection phase as well, is 
the detection of the first command and the last command of a transaction. A 
transaction begins when the previous ends, thus the problem is the detection of the 
end of a transaction. A transactions is ended explicitly (by a commit or rollback 
command) or implicitly (by a Data Definition Language (DDL) statement [1]) by the 
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Fig. 1. Examples of typical profiles of database transactions. 
2.3   Detecting intrusions 
After concluding the learning phase the IIDD tool is able to compare the transactions 
executed by the users with the authorized profiles described in the transaction graphs. 
In this phase every command executed must match a profile. When the first command 
of the transaction is executed the tool searches for all the profiles starting with that 
same command, which are marked as candidate profiles for the current transaction. 
The next command executed is then compared with the second command of these 
candidate profiles. Only those who match remain candidate profiles. This process is 
executed over and over until the transaction reaches its end or there are no more 
candidate profiles for that transaction. In this latter case the transaction is identified as 
malicious. In practice, to detect malicious transactions the IIDD tool implements the 
following generic algorithm over the transactions graph: 
 
while (1) do { 
  for each new command executed do { 
    if user does not have any active transaction then 
      /* command is the 1st command in a new transaction */ 
      obtain list of authorized trans. starting with  
      this command; 
    else { 
      for each valid (authorized) trans. for the user do { 
        if the current command represents a valid successor node  
        in the transaction graph then  
          the command is valid; 
        else 
          mark the current transaction as a non valid trans.; 
      } 
      if there are transactions marked as non valid then 
        a malicious transaction has been detected; 
    } 
  } 
} 
 
When a malicious transaction is detected one or more of the following actions may be 
executed, depending on the DBA choice: 
– Notify the DBA about the intrusion. The database intrusion detection mechanism 
is able to provide the DBA with relevant information such as the user name, the 
time stamp, the database objects damaged, etc. It is also possible to send a 
message (email or SMS) to the DBA to call his immediate attention.  
– Immediately disconnect the user session in which the malicious transaction was 
attempted and prevent it from logging in again. 
– Activate a damage confinement and repair mechanism. When available, damage 
confinement and repair mechanisms are able to confine the damage and recover 
the database to a consistent state previous to the execution of the malicious 
transaction. Another possibility is to isolate that transaction from other user 
transactions (e.g., by creating a virtual database where the malicious transactions 
are executed to prevent spreading wrong or malicious data to the database [10]). 
3   The intrusion detection tool 
Fig. 2 presents the typical environment needed to run our intrusion detection tool. The 
IIDD tool is installed and runs in the Sniffer Computer. The Database Server network 
cable must connect to a LAN switch port. The Sniffer Computer must be connected to 
the span port mirroring of the switch. Switches usually prevent promiscuous sniffing, 
however, most modern switches support span port mirroring, which replicates the data 
from all ports onto a single port allowing the sniffer to capture the network traffic of 
the whole LAN.  
The IIDD tool is a two tier application with a back end module and a front end 
interface (Fig. 3). All the heavy processing is done in the back end which is 
responsible for sniffing the network searching for packets sent to the database, learn 
the profiles and detect the intrusions. It is named DBSniffer and was written in C++ to 
be able to access the network using raw sockets and processing them at the highest 
speed. This program sends messages through the standard output device and creates 
several files for future analysis. It is organized into three modules: sniffer, learner and 
 
detector. The IIDD tool can be run in Windows and Linux operating systems (OS) 
and can be used in any DBMS as the implementation is generic. Both the learning and 
the detection modules use a common function that is responsible for the detection of 
network packets. 
 
Fig. 2. Architecture setup. 
The sniffer is the only DBMS specific component and it is responsible for 
capturing network packets. Because the tool is based on autonomous components that 
provide well defined interfaces, it is very easy to implement that function for several 
DBMS and include it in the tool. For this practical experience report we have chosen 















Fig. 3. IIDD tool. 
The sniffer, learner, and detector modules are executed when they are called by the 
front end application. The front end is a graphical interface, programmed in Java, 
whose function is to configure and launch the back end and to show the results. The 
interface has eight groups with different functions: File, Config, Sniffer, Learner, 
Detector, Action, Status and Information Panel. A screen shot of the prototype's 
interface is shown in Fig. 4. 
The Sniffer group starts and stops the sniffer. The sniffer uses raw sockets and 
places the network adapter in the promiscuous mode. In this mode the network 
adapter is able to intercept and read all the packets in the network (recall that in non-
promiscuous mode the network adapter reads only the packets aimed to it). The 
output information is copied to the Information Panel. The sniffer module retains only 
those packets related to the client database communication and saves that information 
in two files: one with session information (session.txt) and the other with command 
data (auditory.txt). A debug file may also be created containing all the packet 
information captured, before any processing is done to the data. 
The Learner group is used to activate the transaction learning mode. Transaction 
learning includes two steps: parsing and learning. The former uses the auditory.txt file 
(generated by the sniffer component) and is responsible for cleaning the commands 
executed by the database users, removing variable numbers, strings, extra spaces and 
normalizing the case. After that it generates the file aud.txt. Using this file and the 
session.txt file the learner algorithm can now be executed.  In this phase a file is 
created with all the transaction profiles (profile.txt). The output information is copied 
to the Information Panel. This ends the learning phase of our mechanism. 
 
Fig. 4. Interface of the Integrated Intrusion Detection in Databases application. 
 
The Detector group is used to start and stop the online intrusion detector. For the 
detection the network adapter is again placed in promiscuous mode in order to sniff 
all the network packets. The packets are filtered to detect malicious commands 
compared to the transaction profiles previously learned. It also detects deviations 
from the order of execution of commands inside the transaction. Those suspicious 
situations raise warnings immediately, which are saved in a debugging file 
(detect_debug.txt). The output information is copied to the Information Panel. 
The Action group allows the configuration of the actions to be executed when a 
malicious transaction is detected or a transaction is found in a misplaced order. The 
session maybe killed by sending TCP/IP resets. The connection is abruptly broken, 
and the database performs a rollback of the malicious transaction in this situation. The 
DBA may be warned by email, SMS or by a siren sound. 
4   Tool utilization examples 
The well-known TPC-W transactional web benchmark [19] has been used to 
exemplify the tool utilization. This benchmark provides us with a controlled database 
environment quite adequate for the evaluation of the learning and detection 
algorithms. It simulates the activities of an e-commerce business oriented 
transactional web server. A real database application is also used in the experiments, 
the SCE (Serviço Central de Esterilização – Central Service of Sterilization). It is an 
administrative application currently in use in the Hospitals of the University of 
Coimbra (HUC: http://www.huc.min-saude.pt/) used to manage the whole process of 
the sterilized material to and from all services in the HUC. This workflow comprises 
the reception of the material, the selection and the sterilization of the material within a 
central with steam autoclaves and ethylene oxide, various modes of drying, 
packaging, sealing, request and delivery. 
To obtain the latency and the coverage information we have built a SQL command 
line tool that records the time stamp of the command request and the time stamp of 
the server response. It is also capable of some configuration to assist the coverage 
experiments. This SQL command tool obtains a list of the commands (executed by 
the client application being monitored) using the text files created by the learner 
module. With this list we can inject real SQL commands used by the client 
application into the DBMS while the intrusion detection is active. This command 
injection may contain the exact command text, or a slightly altered command, injected 
using a random order. It can also introduce small random changes in the command to 
test the efficiency of the detection mechanism. The statistical distribution of 
utilization of each command is equal to the distribution of the command when 
executed by the application being monitored. 
The TPC-W work-load was executed during one hour to learn the transaction 
profiles (Fig. 5). As a result 8971 transactions containing 18834 commands were 
executed and 32 transaction profiles were learned. As expected, the learning curve 
rises abruptly in the first transactions executed and then its trend is to stabilize over 
time. After the learning phase, TPC-W was executed for three hours to check if the 
learning was exhaustive. No transactions were detected as intrusion, which indicates 
that all transactions were correctly learned. 
 
Fig. 5. TPC-W learning curve. 
As the sniffer is located in a different computer it has no impact on the server 
performance, thus this mechanism has no performance overhead. Furthermore, the 
mechanism does not introduce extra packets in the network, causing no negative 
effect in the network bandwidth.  
 With our SQL command tool we manually injected 50 malicious commands while 
the TPC-W was running to produce the load. They were very simple commands to be 
quickly executed by the server. All these 50 commands were detected as intrusions. 
The largest latency time obtained was 10 milliseconds and the average latency time 
was 1.6 milliseconds. However these times may vary with the network setup and 
usage. All detections were performed before the server had replied to the client, thus 
before the execution of the next command. 
We also performed two additional experiments with extraneous SQL commands 
injection: in the first we injected the correct commands, but in a random order; and in 
the second we made a change in one character randomly placed in each command. 
The distribution of utilization of each command was the real distribution of the 
command when the TPC-W executes it. For the first experiment 1000 transactions 
were executed with a total of 2061 commands. For the second experiment 1000 
transactions were also executed with a total of 2066 commands. All those transactions 
were considered malicious resulting in 100% coverage. 
Besides the TPC-W benchmark, we performed some experiments with a real 
database application: the Central Service of Sterilization database mentioned before. 
The main goal was to evaluate the learning algorithm in a real database scenario, 
helping us to assess the learning transaction curve and to estimate false positives 
caused by incomplete learning. We used the information of one working day of real 
utilization of the database of the SCE, having 8750 commands from 609 sessions and 
accesses 17 tables. This log was applied to the Learning module and 33 transaction 
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Fig. 6. SCE transaction learning during one day 
Fig. 6 shows the learning transaction curve. As we can see, most of the transactions 
(24 out of 33) were learned very quickly, during the first 858 commands (partial log 
1). It is also quite evident that two new groups of database functionalities (and 
corresponding transactions) were executed around the command number 4000 and 
command number 6500, corresponding to the two steps in the learning curve. If we 
had learned only from the partial log 1 or even the partial log 2 it would be necessary 
to make a conditional detection in those periods of time, as all transactions not learned 
in log 1 and log 2 would be detected as false positives. In that case, the database 
administrator would have to add the new transactions to the profile collection, in 
order to avoid further detection of these transactions as false positives. In a typical 
database application there are moments in time where some specific procedures are 
executed (e.g., at the end of the day, at the end of the week, etc) and the time window 
used to learn the profiles must contain those moments. 
An important aspect is that a one day learning period is quite small when we are 
considering applications that are used during many years (as is the case of SCE). In 
fact, a larger period is required as some operations are executed in specific moments 
in time. For the SCE, further experiments showed that a learning period of about a 
week is required to learn almost all transactions.  
5   Conclusions 
In this paper we present a new tool for the detection of malicious transactions in 
DBMS. This database intrusion detection mechanism uses a graph that represents the 
profile of valid transactions to detect unauthorized transactions and consists of three 
different components: SQL command capture, transaction learning and concurrent 
intrusion detection. This tool is generic as it can be used in any typical DBMS, 
including stat-of-the-art commercial DBMS. The setup used to exemplify the tool 
utilization consists of a typical database environment using an Oracle server running 
the workload from the TPC-W benchmark and a real database application. The results 
show that the proposed tool is quite effective and can be easily used by the DBA.  
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